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The Yellow Brick Road to Nowhere:
California Same-Sex Marvin Rights After
Proposition 8
Adam C. Hartmann*
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after Dorothy Gale begins her journey down the
yellow brick road in The Wizard of Oz she comes to a crossroads
that extends in two different directions.1 She wonders aloud
which way to go, when the Scarecrow confuses her by saying that
one way is nice, but the other way is nice too, and some people go
both ways, which he punctuates by simultaneously pointing in
both directions.2 California’s gay and lesbian population can
sympathize with Dorothy’s confusion, having been at the mercy
of the courts for their property and support agreements, while
the courts were metaphorically pointing both ways.3 The picture
is not any clearer today—the contractual rights of same-sex
couples that have forgone the domestic partnership option
remain vague in light of the outcome of Proposition 8.4
* J.D. Candidate, Chapman University School of Law, 2011. I would like to thank
Chapman Law Review 2009–2010 Senior Notes and Comments Editors Katayon Khajebag
and Rachel Warren and Professor Gary Gorczyca for their guidance and suggestions. I
would especially like to thank my wife, Melissa Hartmann, for her constant inspiration,
love and support.
1 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
2 Id.
3 As discussed infra, California’s same-sex couples do not have the same rights to
marry as heterosexual couples; whether unmarried same-sex couples have the same
ability to enforce contracts for property and support is the question that sparked this
Comment. The “signs” pointing both ways symbolize California cases that have split on
whether same-sex couples can enforce cohabitation agreements.
4 The ballot measure known as Proposition 8, which was approved by a majority of
California voters at the November 4, 2008 election, proposed to add a new section to the
California Constitution which provides, “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d
48, 59 (Cal. 2009). For more information on Proposition 8, see CALIFORNIA
PROPOSITION 8: GET THE FACTS ON PROP. 8, http://www.whatisprop8.com/ (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010). Unofficial results showed that the measure passed 52.3% to 47.7%, and a
color-coded map of the results indicates that only citizens in the coastal areas north of Los
Angeles County and a small swath near the California-Nevada border were more likely
than not to have voted “no” on Proposition 8, whereas voters in all inland areas and
nearly all of Southern California were more likely to have voted “yes” on the measure and
thereby approve the state constitutional amendment restricting marriage. Proposition 8—
Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE,
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Proposition 8 has been cast as a same-sex marriage issue,
but it is more than that. Inasmuch as Proposition 8 reiterates
the state’s public policy favoring marriage, it also casts into stark
relief the fact that unmarried couples lack the legislative and
judicial protections marriage confers—particularly the right to
freely contract with one another for support and property.5
California’s approval of so-called “cohabitation contracts,” or
contracts between parties who live together, seemed clear after
Marvin v. Marvin.6 But subsequent California courts have
chipped away at the definitive Marvin decision7 to the point
where it is unclear whether same-sex cohabitants can contract
with one another for property and support.8
This Comment argues that Proposition 8 should spur the
California legislature to clarify same-sex couples’ cohabitation
rights because judicial precedents are inconsistent.9 Part I will
explore the history and growing popularity of cohabitation in the
United States, with particular attention given to sociological
factors that have led heterosexuals and homosexuals alike to opt
for living together before marriage—or even instead of marriage.
Part II will turn to California’s community property scheme as it
affects unmarried cohabiting partners, since property division is
a crucial aspect of cohabitation agreements, and it will examine
ELECTION RESULTS (Nov. 26, 2008, 1:34 PM), http://vote2008.sos.ca.gov/Returns/props/
map190000000008.htm (move cursor around the map for voting results by county).
5 Estimates suggest that married couples enjoy nearly 2,500 combined state and
federal rights that unmarried couples do not. Pittsburgh Considers Domestic Partnership
Law, 2 WESTERN PA FREEDOM TO MARRY COAL. 1, 3 (1997), available at
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/user/scotts/ftp/wpaf2mc/newsletter2-4.pdf. See Kitty Mak,
California’s New Domestic Partner Registration Act May Aid Same-Sex Partners in
Providing a Legal Basis for Their Life Relationships, L.A. CNTY. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=1105 (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) (“there are
limits to what [same-sex] couples may be able to accomplish via contract. Private
contracts have no legal effect on government-conferred rights and obligations such as tax
benefits, parentage, custody and visitation arrangements, and child support obligations”).
6 See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). The Marvin decision
essentially allows cohabitants to contract with one another for property and services,
provided the agreement is not based primarily on sexual services. Id. at 110, 113. See
also People v. Siravo, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“‘Cohabitation’
means simply to live or dwell together in the same habitation”).
7 The pair of cases that threw the Marvin standard into chaos are Jones v. Daly,
176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) and Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988). The cases were confusing because they centered on nearly identical
agreements between same-sex partners, but the latter was upheld while the former was
not. Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 131, 134; Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 406–07, 409–10.
8 Opposite-sex couples could theoretically face the same difficulties enforcing
cohabitation contracts after Proposition 8. This Comment focuses on same-sex couples for
two reasons: one, Marvin v. Marvin remains good law for opposite-sex cohabitation
contracts, despite plaintiff Michelle Triola’s inability to recover damages; two, it is the
author’s belief that Proposition 8 served more to reject homosexual relationships than
establish a hierarchy of heterosexual relationships.
9 See supra note 8.
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how courts have settled past property issues between unmarried
cohabitants. Part III will address the unique aspects of same-sex
cohabitation agreements. Part IV will argue that California
courts may look at same-sex Marvin agreements differently
following Proposition 8. Part IV will also illustrate how Illinois
brought public policy directly to bear on cohabitation agreements,
and will argue that federal or state legislation is crucial in
clarifying and protecting the rights of same-sex couples as
cohabiting partners. Finally, Part V provides drafts of two
potential cohabitation-agreement statutes, one in favor and one
against, to show what such statutes might look like, and to urge
the legislature to devise meaningful cohabitation statutes that
are compatible with existing public policy.
I. COHABITATION AS A SOCIAL TREND
A. Despite its Popularity, Cohabitation Presents Practical and
Sociological Challenges, Especially for Same-Sex Couples
Numerous studies suggest the rate of “cohabitation,” i.e.,
unmarried couples living together, has spiked since the 1960s.10
The Census Bureau has estimated there were about 6.8 million
opposite-sex cohabiting couples in the United States in 2008,11
and an additional 741,000 same-sex cohabiting couples.12
Although cohabitation has been traced back to the early 1800s in
Australia and many European countries, historically it was less

10 MARY ANN LAMANNA & AGNES RIEDMANN, MARRIAGES & FAMILIES: MAKING
CHOICES IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 189–90 (Chris Caldeira et al. eds., 2009). See also NANCY
D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE
LAW 177 (2008) (noting that cohabitation rates have grown significantly since Marvin v.
Marvin).
11 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, As Baby Boomers Age, Fewer Families Have Children
Under 18 at Home, NEWSROOM (Feb. 25, 2009). http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/
archives/families_households/cb09-29.html.
12 MARTIN O’CONNELL & DAPHNE LOFQUIST, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONFERENCE
REPORT, COUNTING SAME-SEX COUPLES: OFFICIAL ESTIMATES AND UNOFFICIAL GUESSES
6–20 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/files/countingpaper.pdf. The 2007 estimate of 741,000 figure for same-sex couples is up from the
estimated 594,000 in the 2000 Census. Id. Earlier estimates of same-sex couples were
unreliable; for example, 253,000 same-sex couples were reported as spouses in the 2000
Census, which was troubling because same-sex marriage was only legalized in 2004, and
at that point only in Massachusetts. Id. The authors speculate that couples may have
selected the “spouse” option because it best represented how they felt, or because it most
resembled their civil union or domestic-partnership status. Id. The rate of unmarried
cohabitation among opposite-sex and same-sex couples has risen more rapidly than first
thought. CATHERINE FITCH ET AL., POPULATION ASS’N OF AMERICA, THE RISE OF
COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: NEW HISTORICAL ESTIMATES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.hist.umn.edu/~ruggles/cohab-revised2.pdf. Flaws in defining cohabiting
couples led the Census Bureau, as well as scholars relying on Census Bureau figures, to
dramatically understate the true number of cohabiting couples in the 1960s and 1970s.
Id.
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common in the United States.13 Likewise, a late-1980s study
indicated that only two percent of adults reaching adulthood just
prior to or shortly after World War II reported having cohabited
before their first marriage.14 Since then, the stigmatization of
unmarried cohabitation has lessened considerably, a change that
marriage researcher David Popenoe attributes primarily to the
sexual revolution in the late-1960s, which essentially endorsed
premarital sex.15
In light of an increasing number of cohabiting couples in
America and many European nations, proponents of cohabitation
advance a number of reasons why cohabitation is desirable—
measuring readiness for, interest in, or compatibility for,
marriage.16 Cohabitation is positively deemed an alternative to
dating or being single,17 thus allowing the partners to develop a
mature relationship and share finances.18 As such, while
13 ARLAND THORNTON ET AL., MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 72 (2007).
David
Popenoe, co-director of the National Marriage Project at Rutgers University, has written
that “[i]n America before 1970, for example, cohabitation was uncommon, a deviant and
unlawful practice found only among people at the margins of our society.” DAVID
POPENOE, NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE AND CHILD
WELLBEING:
A
CROSS-NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/NMP2008CohabitationReport.pdf.
14 THORNTON ET AL., supra note 13 (noting, however, that the population of
cohabitation increased significantly after World War II and even began to affect children;
by the late 1990s, about 40% of all out-of-wedlock births were to cohabiting parents).
15 See POPENOE, supra note 13. Popenoe’s research has indicated that since 1970,
cohabitation has increased more than 1,000%, and cohabiting couples now comprise about
10% of all couples. Id. One study indicated that by 1995, 45% of women between the ages
of nineteen and forty-four had lived with an unmarried partner. Larry Bumpass & Hsienhen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s Family Contexts in the
United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 32 (2000). Likewise, a 2002 report indicated
48.8% of men and 50% of women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four had cohabited
at some point with an opposite-sex partner. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, FERTILITY, CONTRACEPTION, AND FATHERHOOD: DATA ON MEN AND WOMEN
FROM CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 61 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_026.pdf; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF U.S.
WOMEN: DATA FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 86 (2005), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf. One scholar has argued that
the popularity of unmarried cohabitation helps explain the drop in the marriage rate
since the 1970s. KATHLEEN HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE
AND LAW 4 (2006).
16 THORNTON ET AL., supra note 13, at 72–73. Recent studies suggest more than 60%
of young men and women would want to live with a partner before marrying them, to
make sure they are compatible. Id. See also POPENOE, supra note 13 (reporting that in a
national survey of young adults aged twenty to twenty-nine, 43% agreed that “you would
only marry someone if he or she agreed to live together with you first, so that you could
find out whether you really get along”).
17 LAMANNA & RIEDMANN, supra note 10, at 190. There are different motivations for
living with someone;; partners who live together because they don’t want to be single are
“uncommitted cohabitors,” while partners who live together in a marriage-like
relationship are “committed cohabitors.” Id. at 190–91.
18 Valarie King & Mindy E. Scott, A Comparison of Cohabiting Relationships Among
Older and Younger Adults, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 271, 282 (2005) (noting that sharing
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cohabitation is gaining recognition socially and legally,19 hurdles
remain. Historian Stephanie Coontz has concluded that the
United States has not yet completed a transition from a society
where cohabitation was a form of courtship before marriage to
one where cohabitation is acceptable but remains socially and
legally different than marriage.20 Other research indicates that
marriages preceded by cohabitation tend to break up at higher
rates, and cohabitation leads to a higher rate of breakups overall,
even when the couple does not marry.21 Cohabitants are
generally younger, less educated, less religious, earn less income,
and are more likely to have experienced parental divorce or
marital problems during childhood.22 In contrast, married people
are happier, healthier, wealthier, and live longer.23
II. COHABITATION AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
A. A Brief History of Community Property
With cohabitation gaining popularity among the population
at large, it was inevitable that by the early 1970s, California
courts would have to start determining how property should be
divided when cohabitation relationships end.24 California is one
living expenses was a popular reason for cohabitation among both older and younger
survey subjects).
19 POLIKOFF, supra note 10, at 177–78 (noting that the American Law Institute (ALI)
created a “domestic partners” category in its 2006 Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution that applies marital dissolution rules to qualifying cohabiting couples). A
number of commentators sharply criticized the ALI’s move, including Ron Haskins,
welfare policy adviser to President George W. Bush, who said that “[c]ohabitation is a
plague . . . and we should do what we can [to] discourage it.” Id. at 179. See generally
Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner Principles are
One Step in the Right Direction, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 358–80 (2004). For another
perspective on cohabitation, see HEATHER BROOK, CONJUGAL RITES: MARRIAGE AND
MARRIAGE-LIKE RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE THE LAW 153 (2007) (“[Cohabitation] is
simultaneously romantic and mundane; a scene of potential liberation and regulation.
For some, cohabitation is shameful, even sinful. For others, it is a situation arising
almost accidentally, out of apathy or convenience rather than by design.”).
20 LAMANNA & RIEDMANN, supra note 10. See also BROOK, supra note 19, at 165
(describing marriage as a sign of actively accepting state regulation and cohabitation as
passively being regulated by the state).
21 Bumpass & Lu, supra note 15, at 33.
22 NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2007: THE SOCIAL
HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/
SOOU2007.pdf. At least one study has suggested that same-sex couples break up no more
often than heterosexual couples. DONALD J. CANTOR ET AL., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE
LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVOLUTION IN AMERICA 75 (2006) (concluding that “the
factors that can contribute to relationship quality, satisfaction and stability are similar
for heterosexual and homosexual couples”).
23 LAMANNA & RIEDMANN, supra note 10. See also NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT,
THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2007, supra note 22.
24 See generally In re Marriage of Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). See
also Beckman v. Mayhew, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). Both of these cases
were superseded by Marvin v. Marvin. For more explanation, see infra note 51.
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of eight “community property” states,25 where certain property
acquired during a marriage is presumably dedicated to the
maintenance of the relationship and is hence “community”
property.26 Community property is owned equally by both
spouses and is divided equally if the marriage is dissolved. 27
California’s community property system likely originated with
the Visigoth tribes in Europe; it then moved to Spain and the
Spanish territories and, finally, the United States.28 California,
in its first Constitution of 1849, referred to a wife’s separate and
community property rights for the first time.29 The following
year, the California legislature enacted a statute that defined the
contours of California community property law30—a statute that
remains largely intact today.31

25 See GAIL BOREMAN BIRD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 15 n.21 (2008). Community property states include California, Arizona, Idaho,
Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas and Washington. Id. Wisconsin is often
considered the ninth community property state because it adopted a version of the
Uniform Marital Property Act in 1986. Id. See also Howard S. Erlanger & June M.
Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community Property: Wisconsin’s Marital
Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 WIS. L REV. 769, 769 (1990).
26 Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 25.
27 Id. at 71 n.10. In this regard, community property is an equitable system that
protects the less affluent spouse’s interests, at least as compared to the common-law
property system used in the vast majority of states. One scholar suggests that in
common-law property jurisdictions, property is divided at divorce as if the parties had
never been married at all. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A
Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 41, 87 (2008).
28 See supra note 25. One scholar, in tracing community property back to warrior
tribes such as the Visigoths, maintains the community property system promoted a type
of marriage partnership, whereby “community property regimes . . . provide a way to
recognize the contribution of both spouses to the success of the family unit.” Scalise, supra
note 27.
29 BIRD, supra note 25, at 15–16. For years in California, men were believed to
control a married couple’s community property. Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 25, at
773 n.17 (explaining that until 1927, a wife only had an “expectancy interest” in
community property because her husband had more meaningful control over her separate
or community property). Section 803 of the California Family Code, known colloquially as
the Married Women’s Separate Property Presumption, provided that real or personal
property held in a wife’s name alone, which was acquired via a written instrument before
January 1, 1975, was presumed to be the wife’s separate property. CAL. FAM. CODE § 803
(Deering 2010). Currently, a husband’s and wife’s interests in community property are
considered present, equal and existing. CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (Deering 2010).
30 Kelly M. Cannon, Beyond the ‘Black Hole’—A Historical Perspective on
Understanding the Non-Legislative History of Washington Community Property Law, 39
GONZ. L. REV. 7, 14 (2004).
31 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (Deering 2010). See also supra note 25. For an early
perspective on California’s community property system, see Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247,
251–52 (Cal. 1859) (holding that “[t]he statute proceeds upon the theory that the
marriage, in respect to property acquired during its existence, is a community of which
each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and
possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after dissolution”). California’s
community property statute was so influential that Washington copied it nearly word-forword nineteen years later. Cannon, supra note 30, at 14–15.
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B. California Courts Tackle Cohabitation Agreements
Amid cohabitation’s growing popularity, the California Court
of Appeal issued two rulings in a two-year period that oscillated
between setting a clear standard for enforcing cohabitation
agreements and expressing a disdain for nonmarital relationships in general.32 In 1973, a California court applied marriagelike property principles to a cohabitation case, revealing that the
judiciary had an active and valid interest in enforcing
cohabitants’ property rights.33 In In re Marriage of Cary, an
unmarried couple lived together for more than eight years, had
four children together, and held themselves out as married in all
their financial and social dealings, although they were not legally
married.34 When the male partner moved to dissolve the
arrangement and divide the property, the trial court awarded his
partner half of the marital property, and the appellate court
subsequently affirmed the decision.35 According to the California
Court of Appeal, three sections of the Family Law Act36 provided
that each party should receive an equal distribution of the
community property as if the couple had been validly married.37
The Cary court clarified that “the Family Law Act applies not
only to valid marriages. It expressly covers a family relationship
based on a void or voidable marriage where ‘either party or both
parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.’”38
The male partner argued that neither he nor his partner believed
32 See In re Marriage of Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). See also
Beckman v. Mayhew, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
33 See Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 862. While California courts had settled cohabitants’
property claims for years before Cary, the case is significant because it showed some of
the social forces in motion that led to Marvin v. Marvin three years later, which was a
landmark case in California property law. See infra note 51.
34 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
35 Id. at 863, 867. In upholding the marriage-like relationship in this case, the Cary
trial court essentially adopted a “de facto approach to marriage.” Ellen Kandoian,
Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEO.
L.J. 1829, 1847 n.75 (1987).
36 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000–5137 (Deering 2010). Effective January 1, 1994, the
Family Law Act sections of the California Civil Code were repealed and replaced with
equivalent provisions in the California Family Code. Jennifer Klein Mangnall, Stepparent
Custody Rights After Divorce, 26 SW. U. L. REV. 399, 399 (1997).
37 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865. One scholar has opined, “Cary effectively asked: ‘Has
this nonmarital family behaved like a marital family? If so, why not apply our already
well-developed family law?’” Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital
Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME
L.REV. 1265, 1293 (2001).
38 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865–66. The Cary court likened the couple’s relationship
to that of a “putative spouse,” a legal status that effectuates equitable property division
when there is a good-faith belief in an otherwise invalid marriage. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2251 (Deering 2010). Other scholars have compared the Carys’ relationship to a
common-law marriage, which California abolished in 1895. Charlotte K. Goldberg, The
Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483, 487–88 (2007).
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in good faith that their union was a valid marriage, and the
Family Law Act did not address a scenario where the parties had
no good-faith belief in the validity of their union—so the court
should leave the parties where it found them.39
The court disagreed, noting that Mr. Cary’s argument would
force the Legislature to basically endorse deceit.40 A “spouse”
who deceived his partner into believing they were married would
get half of the community property, while two partners who
already knew they were not validly married would be left to fend
for themselves with no help from the courts.41 The Cary decision
was significant because it elevated some cohabitants from just
“living together” to a quasi-married status, affording those
cohabitants the same community property protections as
putative spouses.42 In its closing remarks, the Cary court
explained how closely a cohabitation relationship had to resemble
a marriage in order to gain enforcement from the courts:
It should be pointed out that the criteria for application of the rule we
apply to the case before us is much more than that of an unmarried
living arrangement between a man and woman. The Family Law Act
obviously requires that there be established not only an ostensible
marital relationship but also an actual family relationship, with
cohabitation and mutual recognition and assumption of the usual
rights, duties, and obligations attending marriage.43

Although the Family Law Act has since been repealed,44 the
Cary court clearly threw its weight behind cohabitation
relationships that approached, mimicked, or became nearly
synonymous with marriage, and disdained cohabitation
relationships that represented temporary, casual lifestyle
choices. But subsequent courts, including the California Court of
Appeal just two years later, rejected Cary’s “marriage-like”

39 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The Family Law Act of 1970 ushered in California’s
no-fault divorce regime, whereby spouses could seek a divorce based on “irreconcilable
differences,” without having to prove the other spouse was responsible. Herma Hill Kay,
An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 291 (1987).
“Fault” was likewise not considered in spousal support and property-division awards. Id.
By ascribing fault to both partners, Mr. Cary attempted to circumvent the Family Law
Act, which provided relief in the (far more common) cases where one partner had a goodfaith belief that the marriage was valid but the other did not. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
40 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
41 Id. at 865–66.
42 Although the Carys lived together for a number of years, the court did not
consider them to have a common-law marriage, nor was the decision based in any way on
that prospect. Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867. California abolished common-law marriage in
1895. See infra note 129.
43 Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
44 See supra note 36.
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standard in favor of clear distinctions between cohabitation and
marriage, and a firmer anti-cohabitation stance overall.45
Two years later, a different California Court of Appeal cited
precedent for taking a stricter view of cohabitation
arrangements.46 In Beckman v. Mayhew, the court held that
absent an agreement between the partners, a cohabiting partner
would not automatically assume a share of the couple’s earnings,
and thereby rejected the Cary court’s reliance on the then-valid
Family Law Act.47 As the Beckman court noted:
The Family Law Act deals with divisions of property at the
termination of solemnized marriages and . . . at the termination of
putative marriages. Neither in terms nor by implication does it deal
with non-marital family relationships of the kind involved in Vallera,
Keene and the present case.48

The Beckman decision was significant because it tightened
the judicially-created rules for when a cohabiting partner could

See infra note 48.
Beckman v. Mayhew, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). The Beckman
court’s “stricter view” of cohabitation relationships was not unilaterally grounded in
precedent, however. Notably, the Beckman court did not heed the precedent that Cary
had set two years earlier, making the Beckman court’s reference to stare decisis a curious
one indeed.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 607. One scholar has suggested the Beckman court sympathized with the
female partner’s plight but felt “constrained by precedent” in denying relief. Christina M.
Fernandez, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L. REV. 359,
363 n.14 (1978). As the Beckman court noted, perhaps less elegantly, “[w]e are not
permitted to violate stare decisis for the sake of straws in the wind.” Beckman, 122 Cal.
Rptr. at 608. The precedent relied upon by the Beckman court included Vallera v.
Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 762–63 (Cal. 1943), and Keene v. Keene, 371 P.2d 329, 330 (Cal.
1962), which held that cohabiting partners who knew they were not validly married to
their partners (i.e., the opposite of putative spouses), did not earn the right to share in the
couple’s earnings and accumulations simply by virtue of their cohabitation. A written
agreement would likely be a different matter. In its decision, the Beckman court rejected
not only Cary, but also In re Estate of Atherley, a case where a woman who lived with a
married man for twenty-two years was awarded half of his estate. The court found that
she was entitled to the property because they had “cohabited, pooled resources, resided
together continuously, contributed services to joint projects, and otherwise conducted
business as if they were man and wife.” In re Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975). The Atherley court agreed with Cary that a partner in a so-called “meretricious”
relationship, who knew he or she was not actually married, deserved the same property
rights as a putative spouse—those who do believe in good faith, but incorrectly, that they
are married to their partners. Id. at 46–48. The Atherley court, like Cary, grounded its
decision in the Family Law Act. The court cautioned that
all meretricious relationships, however, do not automatically trigger this
rule . . . the criteria for application of the rule . . . is much more than . . . an
unmarried living arrangement between a man and woman. The Family Law
Act . . . requires . . . there be established not only an ostensible marital
relationship but also an actual family relationship, with cohabitation and
mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights, duties, and obligations
attending marriage.
Id. at 48.
45
46
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expect to recover a share of the couple’s resources and injected a
sense that unmarried relationships could create inequality
between cohabitating partners.49
The Beckman court was
reluctant to protect what it called “non-marital family
relationship,” clarifying that its “descriptive term applies to a
relationship which [many call] meretricious.”50
C. The Advent of the Marvin Agreement
Whatever concerns the California Court of Appeal had about
cohabitation were blown away in 1976 when the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Marvin v. Marvin set a standard for
contractual agreements between intimate partners that still
resonates today.51 In 1964, the actor Lee Marvin and his
girlfriend Michelle Triola made an oral contract that, while they
lived together, they would pool their earnings, share equally any
property acquired during the relationship, and “hold themselves
out to the general public as husband and wife.”52 Additionally,
Triola agreed to furnish her services as a homemaker,

49 This view is supported by Justice Paras’ concurring opinion in Beckman, when he
noted that the decision “promotes a public policy favoring legally binding marriages, with
consequent sounder and more secure familial ties. This public policy has not changed and
should not change.” Beckman, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (Paras, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 605 n.1. For one definition of “meretricious,” see Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
44 n.6, which states that “a meretricious relationship exists if unmarried persons
knowingly live together.”
Generally, “meretricious” is defined as “relating to
prostitution,” but the term is also used to mean “unmarried persons knowingly live
together,” as it does in Atherley. Eric Olsen, How Do Courts Divide Property Acquired
During a Pseudomarital (Meretricious) Relationship? Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App.
880, 812 P.2d 523 (1991), 28 IDAHO L. REV. 1091, 1091 n.1 (1992); Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 44 n.6. Of the community property states, only Washington treats unmarried
cohabitants as equivalent to marital spouses. Olsen, supra at 1092. Arizona, New Mexico,
Nevada, California and Wisconsin treat unmarried cohabitants as contractual partners
and divide assets based on whatever agreement the parties had. Id. at 1902–93, 1096.
51 See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Marvin added to the
lexicon an enduringly popular but non-legal term, “palimony,” which puns on the support,
or “alimony,” which one might pay to a cohabitant, or “pal,” rather than an ex-spouse.
Some have questioned the case’s impact, noting that the available contractual and
equitable remedies it endorsed were the same ones available beforehand. Ann Laquer
Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1381 (2001). “With all its
celebrity, the Marvin decision stands more as a cultural icon than as a legal watershed.”
Id. at 1383. Indeed, Marvin did not clear up the question regarding which cohabitation
agreements were enforceable. There is a line of cases that involving same-sex
partnership agreements that are uncommon in California and seem to have undergone
greater judicial scrutiny compared to their opposite-sex partnership counterparts. See
generally Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Whorton v. Dillingham,
248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). See also infra note 68.
52 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110. Inasmuch as the Marvin-Triola agreement spelled out
the financial terms of their union, at least one scholar would liken it to “first-degree
promising,” an early stage along the relationship continuum that emphasizes the actors’
self-interested, economic well-being. Eric G. Andersen, Three Degrees of Promising, 2003
BYU L. REV. 829, 832 (2003).
Second-degree and third-degree promising are
comparatively more spiritual and less financial in nature. Id. at 832–33.
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housekeeper, cook, and companion in exchange for Marvin’s
agreement to “provide for all of [Triola’s] financial support and
needs for the rest of her life.”53 During the cohabitation, which
lasted until May 1970, Marvin acquired significant amounts of
property that included motion picture rights worth more than
$1 million.54 The cohabitation ended when Marvin made Triola
leave the residence in May 1970 after about a year and a half of
financially supporting her.55 Marvin was married during much
of his cohabitation with Triola, and his final divorce decree from
Betty Marvin was not filed until January 1967.56 Triola sought
declaratory relief to ascertain her contractual and property
rights, and sought a constructive trust over half of the property
the couple acquired during the cohabitation.57 Marvin claimed
the agreement was unenforceable because their relationship was
illicit, adulterous, and illegally promoted divorce. He also
analogized between their agreement and a breached promise to
marry, noting that the promises were basically the same in the
two agreements and a breached promise to marry was not
actionable.58

53 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110. See also Brook, supra note 19, at 164 (disputing the
contention that cohabiting partners have no duty to support one another financially).
54 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
55 Id. Oral agreements, such as the one in Marvin, present particular problems. As
one scholar points out:
Unfortunately, few cohabiting couples make such express contracts. Especially
in states which limit the Marvin remedy to express agreements, this contractlaw approach invites outright perjury concerning an oral understanding, or
what might be called quasi-perjury, by which one of the cohabitants, after the
breakup of the couple, ‘recalls’ a conversation about their agreeing to share
their lives together which he or she after-the-fact contorts (perhaps even in
good faith) into a community-property type pooling contract.
William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A
Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1687 (1984). After her
relationship with Marvin ended, Triola began a cohabitation relationship with actor Dick
Van Dyke that lasted until her death in 2009 at age seventy-five. Elaine Woo, Lawsuit
Against Well-Known Actor Made Palimony a Fact of Life, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2009, at
C8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/31/
AR2009103102007.html. In 1983, Triola told the press that she had a written contract
with Van Dyke to avoid further legal problems. Id.
56 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 111.
57 Id. at 110–11.
58 Id. at 112–15. Specifically, Marvin claimed his agreement with Triola and the
typical breached promise to marry each included implied promises of support and pooled
resources. Id. Because an action based on a breached promise to marry was barred by
section 43.5(d) of the Civil Code, an agreement (like Marvin and Triola’s) that included
the same implied promises, but did not include a promise to marry, should not be
actionable either. Id. at 115–16. Marvin did not prevail on this line of reasoning, and the
court noted that since the statute’s enactment in 1939, no lawyer had ever invoked that
line of reasoning. Id. at 116. Other courts have adopted the Marvin court’s conclusion
that promises between unmarried partners that are independent of a breach of promise to
marry are enforceable. See Miller v. Ratner, 688 A.2d 976, 976 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997);
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 908 (N.J. 1979) (noting that “[w]e do no more than
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The court rejected each of Marvin’s claims and held that
unmarried cohabitants could make and enforce contracts
regarding earnings and property, although in this case, the court
had found no agreement, express or otherwise, between Marvin
and Triola.59
The court ruled that generally, agreements
“expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of
sexual services” were invalid, while relationships like the one in
Marvin, which merely “contemplated” a nonmarital relationship,
were valid and severable.60 Finally, the court rejected Cary’s
reliance on the Family Law Act of 1970, deciding instead that
courts and not the legislature should sort out property claims
among cohabitants: “provisions of the Family Law Act do not
govern the distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital
relationship . . . [which] remains subject solely to judicial
decision.”61

recognize that society’s mores have changed, and that an agreement between adult
parties living together is enforceable to the extent it is not based on a relationship
proscribed by law, or on a promise to marry”).
59 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116. Some sources suggest the Marvin decision reflected a
newfound judicial tolerance of nontraditional family relationships, inasmuch as the
decision declined to find the couple’s agreement based upon illegal consideration. See
HARV. LAW REVIEW ASS’N, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation:
Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708, 1713–14 (1977).
60 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 113–14. “Meretricious” has been defined several ways by
California courts.
The Marvin court used “nonmarital” and “meretricious”
interchangeably throughout the decision. Other courts have found that “meretricious”
simply means “of or relating to prostitution,” while acknowledging that other states have
widened the definition to mean “unmarried cohabitants.” See Zoppa v. Zoppa, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 901, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). See also supra note 50.
61 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 106, 110. Significantly, the Marvin court here used the term
“nonmarital relationship” rather than “cohabitation,” possibly anticipating the questions
about what qualified as “cohabitation.” Id. In Cochran v. Cochran, Patricia Cochran
(whose last name was changed to match with her boyfriend’s) sued her boyfriend and
sometimes live-in lover—the late, infamous attorney Johnnie Cochran—for breach of a
Marvin agreement. Cochran v. Cochran, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899, 900–01 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). Mr. Cochran moved for summary judgment on Ms. Cochran’s claim that he
breached their Marvin agreement, arguing that he was not cohabiting with her when the
agreement was made—the couple spent an average of two to four nights together per
week. Id. at 902–05. In denying Mr. Cochran’s motion, the court decided to
save for another day the issue whether consenting adults need cohabit [sic] at
all in order to enter an enforceable agreement regarding their earnings and
property. Assuming for discussion's sake that cohabitation is required, [the
court] conclude[s] that the rationale of Marvin is satisfied in appropriate cases
by a cohabitation arrangement that is less than full-time. Here, as so
construed, there was sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact on the
cohabitation element.
Id. at 905.
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III. SAME-SEX PARTNERS AND MARVIN AGREEMENTS
A. Jones v. Daly (1981) and Whorton v. Dillingham (1988)
The Marvin case set a contractual standard62 for
heterosexual couples that same-sex couples soon began to test.
Despite the courts’ exclusive power to adjudicate Marvin
agreements, California appellate courts did little to clarify the
Marvin holding for same-sex couples.63 In essence, courts have
determined that same-sex cohabitation agreements are
enforceable when they include agreements for services separate
from the “cohabitation state.”64 However, courts have not fully
defined which activities are or are not naturally part of the

62 Not every commentator looks favorably upon contractual relationships between
intimate partners. JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, THE LIMITS TO UNION: SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 81 (2002) (stating that it “connotes a
worldview in which the accretion of social obligation is dissolved in the intentional
arrangements of the autonomous individual of the marketplace”).
63 See Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Whorton v.
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). While Marvin likened
“meretricious” relationships to prostitution, other courts (like Zoppa) have defined
“meretricious” relationships simply as those between unmarried, committed partners. See
supra note 60; Soltero v. Wimer, 150 P.3d 552, 555 (Wash. 2007) (holding that “[a]
‘meretricious relationship’ is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit
with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist”). In Gormley v.
Robertson, a Washington appellate court, in holding that the meretricious relationship
doctrine was applicable to same-sex couples, noted that:
[A] same-sex relationship cannot be a meretricious relationship because such
persons do not have a ‘quasi-marital’ relationship . . . . Because persons of the
same sex cannot legally marry, they are ‘not entitled to the rights and
protections of a quasi-marriage, such as community property-like
treatment . . . . But it is of no consequence to the cohabitating couple, same-sex
or otherwise, whether they can legally marry. Indeed, one of the key elements
of a meretricious relationship is knowledge by the partners that a lawful
marriage between them does not exist. . . . [Although] the ability of same-sex
couples to legally marry is for the legislature to decide, . . . the rule that courts
must ‘examine the [meretricious] relationship and the property accumulations
and make a just and equitable disposition of the property’ is a judicial, not a
legislative, extension of the rights and protections of marriage to intimate,
unmarried cohabitants.
Gormley v. Robertson, 83 P.3d 1042, 1045–46 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Delaware courts
have used “meretricious” to refer to a married person cohabiting with an unmarried
person. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 104 A.2d 463, 464–64 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954).
Meanwhile, some courts seem unsure of how to classify unmarried same-sex cohabitants.
For example, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that a “live-in lover” statute
permitting modification of alimony does not apply to a same-sex lover. See Van Dyck v.
Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853, 854–55 (Ga. 1993). Similarly, an Alabama court found that
while alimony can be terminated when a spouse is living with an opposite-sex partner, the
termination clause does not apply to a same-sex lover. See J.L.M. v. S.A.K., 18 So.3d 384,
388–89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
64 Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 409–10. Despite the court’s careful explanation about
compensable services, the court in Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 92 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) suggested that homemaking services were not the operative factor in Whorton,
which suggests that the Jones agreement failed because of the explicit reference to
serving as a “lover.” See infra note 69. See also Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 130–31.
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cohabitation state, thus leaving open the question which services
make a cohabitation contract enforceable. For example, in
Jones v. Daly, one same-sex partner sued for declaratory relief
entitling him to half of his deceased partner’s estate.65 Three
months into their relationship, the pair made an oral agreement
that they would combine their earnings and efforts, share any
and all property, “hold themselves out to the public at large as
cohabiting mates, and [plaintiff] would render his services as a
lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper
and cook.”66 In return, the decedent agreed to support the
plaintiff financially for the rest of the plaintiff’s life, an
arrangement that lasted until the decedent’s death
approximately two years later.67
The California appellate court dismissed the plaintiff’s action
for declaratory relief and sustained the defendant’s demurrer to
the complaint, finding that the cohabitation agreement was
inescapably based upon the couple’s sexual relationship.68
The court noted that “[n]either the property sharing nor the
support provision of the agreement rests upon plaintiff’s acting

Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 130–31.
Id. at 131–33 (noting that sexual services were an inseparable part of the
consideration for the contract).
67 Id. at 131.
68 Id. at 134. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Cowboy Contracts: The Arizona Supreme
Court’s Grand Tradition of Transactional Fairness, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 191, 205 n.89 (2008)
(noting that the Jones agreement foundered because it explicitly referred to the same-sex
couple as “lovers”); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997, 1103 n.473 (1985) (indicating that the Jones court’s conclusion that sexual
services could not be severed from the other services under the agreement was essentially
the same as the conclusion in Marvin, despite the court’s attempt to distinguish Jones
from Marvin). Looking at the Marvin decision in terms of Jones, it is unclear what made
Triola’s services severable where Jones’ were not, other than the gender of the parties
involved. One possibility is that homosexual relationships are, fair or not, considered to
be based primarily on sex. In Lawrence v. Texas, a landmark 2003 case that struck down
Texas’ anti-sodomy law, Justice O’Connor suggested that Texas’ law was based on the
presumption that same-sex intimate relationships were irreducibly based on sex:
[B]ecause Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private,
consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval
against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior . . . . Texas
argues, however, that the sodomy law does not discriminate against
homosexual persons. Instead, the State maintains that the law discriminates
only against homosexual conduct. While it is true that the law applies only to
conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated
with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, Texas’ sodomy law is
targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a
class.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Lawrence, inasmuch as it goes right to the sexual question, echoes the viewpoint Justice
O’Connor criticized. His dissent frames Lawrence in terms of a “fundamental right” to
engage in homosexual sodomy, as noted in the Bowers v. Hardwick decision some
seventeen years prior. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65
66
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as [decedent’s] traveling companion, housekeeper or cook as
distinguished from acting as his lover. The latter service forms
an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement and
renders it unenforceable in its entirety.”69
Seven years later, the California Court of Appeal found that
a cohabitation agreement was enforceable when the services in
question included bodyguard, business partner, chauffeur, and
secretary.70 The court reasoned that those services were separate
from the sexual relationship and thus comprised separate
consideration for the agreement.71 The court reached that result
although the sexual services were an express part of a same-sex
couple’s cohabitation agreement, unlike the agreements in
Marvin and Jones.72 Distinguishing its holding from the Jones
decision, the Whorton court found that “Jones is factually
different in that the complaining party did not allege contracting
to provide services apart from those normally incident to the
state of cohabitation itself.”73 In contrast, the Whorton couple
had an agreement that included for-pay and gratuitous services,
where they were severable and able to serve as consideration for
their agreement.74 Basically, California appellate courts have
69 Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Nonmarital agreements that “facilitate adultery”
were considered so immoral that nothing, even a written agreement, could make them
enforceable. See McCall v. Frampton, 438 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). To
mitigate the illegal or immoral nature of the cohabitation contract, an agreement had to
include non-domestic services that could form an independent basis for the contract,
allowing the non-sexual services to be severed from the sexual ones. See id. at 13 (finding
that “where the [cohabitation] agreement consists in part of an unlawful objective and in
part of lawful objectives, under certain circumstances the illegality may be severed and
the legal components enforced”). Despite the Marvin court’s assertion that domestic
services comprised lawful and adequate consideration, the Jones plaintiff failed to
recover. Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr at 134.
70 Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
71 Id. at 408–09.
72 Id. at 408.
73 Id. at 410.
The court here may be referencing the “lovers” issue raised by
Braucher. See supra note 68. Denying relief to the Jones plaintiff for, essentially,
cohabitating is curious because he was as close to married as he could get in the days
before domestic partnerships. As one commentator said of the decision, “The Jones
holding makes even less sense than holdings declining enforcement in a heterosexual
context, since in the context of homosexual cohabitation no option to marry exists.”
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State
Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 286 n.305 (1982).
74 The Whorton court explained that the chauffeur and business partner duties were
“significantly different than those household duties normally attendant to nonbusiness
cohabitation and are those for which monetary compensation ordinarily would be
anticipated.” Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410. But, over time, California courts changed
their stance on homemaking services functioning as consideration for a Marvin
agreement. Nearly twenty years after Whorton, the California Court of Appeal said of
contracts that centered on one party’s homemaking services:
[A] ‘promise to perform homemaking services is, of course, a lawful and
adequate consideration for a contract . . . otherwise those engaged in domestic
employment could not sue for their wages . . . .’ Marvin expressly rejected the
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determined that same-sex cohabitation agreements are
enforceable when they include “for-pay” services, but it is unclear
which services are for-pay and which are not, and whether
domestic duties should qualify as paid services, or are simply an
expected part of a sexual relationship.
B. Same-Sex Cohabitants and the Severability Problem
The enforceability of cohabitation agreements is particularly
important for California’s same-sex couples, who have a major
stake in such agreements,75 because same-sex couples cannot
legally marry in California.76 Shortly after the Marvin decision,
the California Legislature drew a sharp distinction between
heterosexual and same-sex couples when it amended section 300
of the California Family Code to exclude same-sex partners from
entering a lawful marriage.77 That distinction was reinforced in
2000 when California voters approved Proposition 22, which
likewise restricted California to recognizing only marriages
between a man and a woman.78 Same-sex couples had gained
argument that the partner seeking to enforce the contract must have
contributed either property or services additional to ordinary homemaking
services.
Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation
omitted).
75 At least one critic argues that same-sex marriage might restrict same-sex couples’
freedom rather than enhance it. See David L. Chambers, What If?: The Legal
Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95
MICH. L. REV. 447, 487 (1996). See also Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation,
Normalisation: Rhetorics of Justification in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 107 (Robert Wintemute et al. eds., 2001) (interpreting Chambers’
ideas to mean “the danger to gay liberty [from marriage] is mitigated by the increasing
availability of antenuptual agreements and other contractual inroads on marriage as a
rigidly state-defined status”).
76 The California Family Code states that “only marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2010).
However, same-sex couples can register as domestic partners, a status that confers many
of the same rights and privileges as those of marriage. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (Deering
2010).
77 Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 468 n.11 (Cal. 2004) (finding that
“the language in Family Code section 300 specifying that marriage is a relation ‘between
a man and a woman’ was adopted by the Legislature in 1977, when the provision was set
forth in former section 4100 of the Civil Code . . . . The legislative history of the measure
makes its objective clear”).
78 Proposition 22, passed in 2000 but struck down by the California Supreme Court
in May 2008, added section 308.5 to the California Family Code, which defined legal
marriage as only between a man and a woman. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2010).
See also Bird, supra note 25, at 203. Some scholars have argued that section 308.5 merely
clarified which out-of-state marriages California would recognize, and thereby did not
affect the possibility of same-sex marriage within California, since the section was part of
section 308 of the California Family Code, “validity of foreign marriages.” See Enrique A.
Monagas, California’s Assembly Bill 205, the Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act of 2003: Is Domestic Partner Legislation Compromising the Campaign
for Marriage Equality?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 46–47 (2006).
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only a limited form of recognition in 1999, when the California
Legislature enabled same-sex couples to register as domestic
partners.79 While the rights domestic partners enjoy echo some
of the protections that traditional married couples enjoy,80 some
note, accurately, that domestic partnerships are not the
functional equivalent of marriage for same-sex couples.81 Others
have argued that the registration requirements for domestic
partner-ships
will
invalidate
already-existing
Marvin
agreements.82 And, whether a same-sex couple has opted for
their lone “marriage” option may well determine whether one
partner can enforce a cohabitation agreement in today’s postProposition 8 political landscape.83

79 Section 297 of the California Family Code defines domestic partners as “two
adults who have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed
relationship of mutual caring.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (Deering 2010). To qualify, the
partners must file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary of State, and
must meet the following requirements: 1) Each partner is at least eighteen years of age;
2) they share a common residence; 3) neither partner is married to or involved in an
active domestic partnership with anyone else; 4) the partners are not related by blood in a
way that would disallow them from marrying otherwise; and 5) they are of the same sex
or one or both partners is over the age of sixty-two. Id.
80 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 297.5 (Deering 2010).
81 See Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that by creating domestic partnerships, the Legislature had not created same-sex
marriage by a different name thereby rejecting the argument that domestic partnership is
the functional equivalent of marriage). In fact, domestic partners do not receive a number
of marital rights and benefits. For example, they may not file federal joint tax returns
and they are not entitled to numerous benefits provided to married couples by the federal
government, such as marital benefits relating to Social Security, Medicare, federal
housing, food stamps, veterans’ benefits, military benefits, and federal employment
benefit laws. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE
OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04353r.pdf. The Knight court went on to highlight other differences between
domestic partnerships and traditional marriage: minors may marry with parental consent
but cannot become domestic partners, heterosexual prisoners may marry but their
homosexual counterparts may not become domestic partners, domestic partnerships are
much more easily dissolved than marriages, and, unlike traditional marriage, domestic
partnerships may not be recognized by other states, nor may other states recognize
domestic partners’ rights to visit their hospitalized partner and to make medical decisions
for him or her. The court concluded, “The numerous dissimilarities between the two types
of unions disclose that the Legislature has not created a ‘same-sex marriage’ under the
guise of another name” (citations omitted). Id. See also Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic Partner
Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective,
51 UCLA L. REV. 1555, 1566 (2004) (“[D]omestic partnership legislation may be surer and
less socially divisive than constitutionally compelled same-sex marriage or civil
union . . . [but] the choice is not society’s or the state’s to make. Only gay men and
lesbians can choose to forgo ultimate rights in favor of a surer, but lesser, alternative.”)
(emphasis added).
82 See Monagas, supra note 78, at 50 (explaining that Assembly Bill 205 could void
same-sex couples’ cohabitation agreements once those couples seek to register with the
state as domestic partners).
83 See infra Part IV.C and note 113. Some commentators noted in the wake of
Marvin that marriage as a concept was in flux, and courts were backing away from
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Historically, gender has not impacted couples’ abilities to
enforce cohabitation agreements, as courts have not considered
the gender of the parties when determining the enforceability of
a cohabitation agreement.84 Rather, the relative severability of
the sexual relationship—the extent to which the sexual
relationship can be considered separately from the other bases
for the agreement—has been determinative in the enforceability
of cohabitation agreements, a point emphasized by the Marvin
court.85 The underlying assumption in Marvin and its progeny,
which includes Jones and Whorton, is that sexual relations are
an implicit aspect of an intimate relationship, and sex is one of
the things an intimate partner is expected to provide for his or
her partner.86 Accordingly, an agreement where one partner’s
sexual performance makes up most or all of that partner’s
consideration under the contract would be an illegal contract and
void as against public policy.87 However, if a court determines
that the sexual relationship is tangential to the agreement, then
the agreement can be upheld.88 A California court confronted
with a Marvin-type agreement that implicitly or explicitly
includes sexual relations has the option to sever the sexual
relationship—which represents illicit consideration—from the
other services in the contract, and uphold the rest.89 In deciding

defining it. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L. J. 441, 442
(1976).
84 However, the Jones decision casts some doubt upon this conclusion. See supra note
66.
85 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114 (Cal. 1976).
86 Id. But see Hall v. Duster, 727 So. 2d 834, 837 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (holding that
“[s]exual relations between the parties is not an indispensable element of cohabitation”).
87 Just as the Marvin court’s rationale has been questioned in light of Jones, so too
has the Marvin court’s view of the illegality of sexual services in a cohabitation
agreement. See William Van Alstyne, The Unbearable Lightness of Marriage in the
Abortion Decisions of the Supreme Court: Altered States in Constitutional Law, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 61, 72 n.53 (2009) (arguing that “[cohabitation] agreements were
formerly void on public policy grounds (akin to contracts of prostitution or meretricious
criminal cohabitation). But nonmarital cohabitation is currently not merely lawful in
most jurisdictions, rather, it is on its way to becoming a protected civil right”).
88 California courts have held for years that cohabiting adults may have an ongoing
sexual relationship, even a meretricious one, at the time they make a property agreement
and still make an enforceable contract. See Bridges v. Bridges, 270 P.2d 69, 71 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1954). In Alderson v. Alderson, the court held that a relationship based on
“many . . . things,” including but not limited to sex, was not a relationship expressly based
on meretricious considerations. 225 Cal. Rptr 610, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The
petitioner’s consideration for the contract was being respondent’s wife and doing
“whatever a wife does,” not just sex. Id.
89 See Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (reiterating that
“although Civil Code section 1599 authorizes a court to sever the illegal object of a
contract from the legal[,] it does not require the court to do so”). See also Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 696 (Cal. 2000) (“[T]he doctrine of severance
attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so would not be condoning an
illegal scheme [where t]he overarching inquiry is whether ‘the interests of
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whether to enforce a contract with illegal and legal elements, the
court must be guided by equitable considerations.90 In sum,
California courts have held that the enforceability of a
cohabitation agreement, for same-sex or opposite-sex couples
alike, depends upon the degree to which the agreement
contemplates one party furnishing sexual services as
consideration; the less this is so, the more enforceable the
agreement becomes.91 This gender-neutral view has led some
commentators to call California’s enforcement of cohabitation
agreements a “pure contract” approach.92
IV. WHAT LIES AHEAD: THE CHANGING FACE OF THE MARVIN
AGREEMENT
A. California Courts May Treat Same-Sex Agreements
Differently Post-Proposition 8
Although California courts have been gender-disinterested,
the trend could change in light of Proposition 8, despite the
courts’ attempt to claim otherwise.93 A “Marvin agreement,” as
used here, is a gender-irrelevant term.94 However, prior to
Proposition 8, California courts upheld many of the Marvin-type
cohabitation agreements under a public-policy regime that, while
defining the allowable limits of same-sex relationships, had done
so in a way that provoked much less controversy than the

justice . . . would be furthered’ by severance.”) (citation omitted). Cf. Marathon Entm’t v.
Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 753 (Cal. 2008) (echoing Yoo that courts have the power but not the
duty to sever illegal aspects of a contract).
90 See Yoo, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 751. See also Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86,
93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that despite equitable considerations, petitioner did not
deserve to have the legal and illegal aspects of her Marvin agreement severed because
“[e]quity does not demand acceptance of the most favorable set of multiple conflicting
versions of the facts set forth by a party in her pleadings”).
91 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114–15 (Cal. 1976).
92 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979).
93 See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 76 (Cal. 2009) (finding that “Proposition 8
reasonably must be interpreted in a limited fashion as eliminating only the right of samesex couples to equal access to the designation of marriage, and as not otherwise affecting
the constitutional right of those couples to establish an officially recognized family
relationship”).
94 Notably, the Marvin decision uses gender-neutral language throughout, referring
to “nonmarital partners” rather than “man” and “woman,” which has led some to conclude
the court felt Marvin applied equally to same-sex couples. See Sharmila Roy Grossman,
Comment, The Illusory Rights of Marvin v. Marvin for the Same-Sex Couple Versus the
Preferable Canadian Alternative—M. v. H., 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 547, 550 (2002); Rebecca L.
Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and
Evolving Definitions of “Family,” 29 J. FAM. L. 497, 512 (1990–1991). More likely, the
Marvin court’s language reflected a desire to erase gender from its decision rather than
surreptitiously beckon to same-sex couples, considering the pure contractual approach of
California courts described in Hewitt.
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Proposition 8 debate that polarized the California community.95
It is important to realize that, while California has moved away
from bringing gender to its discussion of cohabitation
agreements,96 or other rights that have been granted to
homosexual partners,97 the state’s courts have also not faced a
spate of Marvin agreements under the current public policy that
the marriage designation is reserved solely for a man and a
woman.98 California courts have already reflected in their
decisions the electorate’s will that same-sex relationships cannot
enjoy traditional marriage.99 Until and unless the Legislature
clarifies same-sex couples’ cohabiting rights, California courts
will probably have to shape the contours of cohabitants’ property
rights, in terms of what the Legislature and voters have already
decided.100

95 See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/
politics/06marriage.html. Some have argued that California’s Proposition 8 electorate
was a unique population, where African American voters voted for Proposition 8’s ban on
same-sex marriage in much greater numbers than Latino voters. See Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Sexual Politics and Social Change, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1523, 1535 (2009)
(estimating that seventy percent of African American voters and fifty-three percent of
Latino voters supported Proposition 8’s ban on same-sex marriage). The measure passed
by a fifty-two percent to forty-eight percent margin overall and a majority of white voters
did not vote for it. See Joe Von Kanel & Hal Quinley, Exit Polls: Gay Marriage in CA,
CNNPOLITICS (Nov. 5, 2008, 12:25 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008/11/05/
exit-polls-gay-marriage-in-california/. Others have argued that black voters did not cause
Proposition 8 to pass, and have derided the so-called “scapegoating” of blacks stemming
from the vote. See, e.g., Jennifer Holladay & Catherine Smith, A Cautionary Tale: The
Obama Coalition, Anti-Subordination Principles and Proposition 8, 86 DEN. U. L. REV.
819, 828 (2009).
96 See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116. See also Grossman, supra note 94.
97 See Strauss, 207 P.3d 48 at 78 (holding that “although Proposition 8 changes the
state Constitution . . . in all other respects same-sex couples retain the same substantive
protections embodied in the state constitutional rights of privacy and due process as those
accorded to opposite-sex couples and the same broad protections under the state equal
protection clause”).
98 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Deering 2010). See also Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75.
99 See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 75.
The Strauss decision was careful to note that
Proposition 8 simply reserved the designation “marriage” for unions between one man and
one woman, and did not affect “the constitutional right to establish an officially
recognized family relationship with the person of one’s choice.” Id. at 74.
100 For commentary on the courts’ role as interpreters, not progenitors, of policy, see
Vierra v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that the “[courts’] function is not to make policy, but to interpret the law as it is
written”). See also Cal. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist., 927
P.2d 1175, 1177 (Cal. 1997) (“[T]he judicial role in a democratic society is fundamentally
to interpret laws, not to write them. The latter power belongs primarily to the people and
the political branches of government.”) (internal citations omitted).
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B. Hewitt v. Hewitt and the Role of Public Policy in Marvin
Agreements
Those courts will someday have to answer a question
unfathomable in 1976: should same-sex couples even have the
right to make enforceable Marvin agreements? That the answer
is probably “yes” obscures the real point, which is that the
question can even be posed. That question was not in play in
1981 for Jones,101 nor in 1988 for Whorton,102 but it is in play
now because of California’s newly-reiterated public policy
defining the limits of same-sex relationships.103 While it is
difficult to predict the success of a same-sex Marvin agreement in
the wake of Proposition 8, California courts have already made
clear that opposite-sex cohabitation relationships enjoy limited
recognition rights.104 It is easy to assume a California court,
confronted with a same-sex Marvin agreement at some future
date, would enforce the agreement by the same guidelines
dictated by Jones or Whorton, as vague as those might be.105 Yet,
the playing field is different now than it was then, insofar as
California voters decisively enacted their own public policy
regarding same-sex relationships through the Proposition 8
campaign and ballot measure. Consequently, it is perhaps too
easy to assume California courts will tune out public policy in
making future decisions about same-sex couples—up to and
including enforcement of Marvin agreements.106
To ascertain how California courts might treat a same-sex
Marvin case after Proposition 8, it is instructive to see how other
states treat Marvin agreements, considering that same-sex
marriage ballot initiatives have appeared on thirty-one state

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Proposition 8 was called the “Marriage Protection Act,” which relates to the
similar Illinois legislation defining the rights and responsibilities of married partners at
issue in Hewitt. See infra note 106.
104 See Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988). In Elden, an unmarried
cohabitant sued to recover damages resulting from the death of his partner in a car
accident, arguing their committed cohabitation relationship resembled a marriage. Id. at
582–83. The court declined to equate their cohabitation with a marriage, noting that “the
state has a strong interest in the marriage relationship; to the extent unmarried
cohabitants are granted the same rights as married persons, the state's interest in
promoting marriage is inhibited.” Id. at 586.
105 See supra note 74.
106 In 1979, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Hewitt v. Hewitt that an opposite-sex
cohabitation agreement was invalid. What was notable about the decision was the court’s
acknowledgement that public policy had played a role in its decision, inasmuch as
strengthening marriage was the purpose of the then-recently enacted Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ill. 1979).
101
102
103
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ballots, including California’s, and lost each time.107 The closest
analogy to California’s post-Proposition 8 public policy is Illinois,
whose Supreme Court decided a cohabitation case three years
after Marvin that continues to affect cohabiting couples there
regardless of gender.108 In Hewitt v. Hewitt, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the cohabitation agreement in question was
unenforceable because agreements with sexual relations (of any
level, presumably) as an explicit consideration were invalid
under Illinois law.109 The court also held that the agreement
violated public policy; to wit, enforcing the agreement would
mean endorsing a nonmarital relationship at odds with the
state’s public policy promoting marriage.110 The first part of the
holding is typical of other states’ decisions, including California’s,
although in California sexual relations can be part of the
agreement as long as they are not an inseparable aspect.111 The
second part of the holding is significant, not because the Illinois
court disfavored the agreement but why: the court cited public
policy grounds for declining to enforce a contract between two
consenting adults, thereby augmenting (if not outright replacing)
contract law with public policy.112

107 Glenn Adams & David Crary, Maine Voters Reject Same-Sex Marriage Law,
CNSNEWS.COM (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/56583. Same-sex marriage
initiatives have appeared on thirty-one state ballots, with all thirty-one states voting to
ban or otherwise restrict same-sex marriage. The states include: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage,
PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, http://pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-andHomosexuality/State-Policies-on-Same-Sex-Marriage.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). One
factor in Proposition 8’s success in California was the relative ease with which the
California Constitution could be amended. The California Constitution is far easier to
amend than its federal counterpart, while the state constitutions of Connecticut and
Iowa—two states that offer same-sex marriage—cannot be amended through the
initiative process. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 64 (Cal. 2009).
108 Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1208. It bears noting that Hewitt involved an opposite-sex
relationship, but the general policy points are instructive. “It is generally agreed that
Hewitt in no small measure was decided in light of, and perhaps in response to,
Marvin . . . nearly all reported cases from other jurisdictions since 1979 fall somewhere in
between, and most cite, as persuasive authority, one or the other.” Richard A. Wilson, The
State of the Law of Protecting and Securing the Rights of Same-Sex Partners in Illinois
Without Benefit of Statutory Rights Accorded Heterosexual Couples, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
323, 323 n.62 (2007).
109 Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1208.
110 Id. See also Wilson, supra note 108, at 337, 335 (arguing that the pro-marriage
public policy that dictated Hewitt also continues to foreclose same-sex couples’ Marvin
rights, although Wilson notes that Illinois does not offer same-sex couples a domestic
partnership option).
111 Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Chiba v. Greenwald, 67
Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
112 Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
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Since Hewitt is not a gender-based decision, it’s rationale
could be adopted by a state that has a strong public policy
against unmarried, unregistered113 same-sex couples entering
into a marriage-like relationship—a state like California.114 To
return to the question that started this section, then, should
same-sex couples even have their Marvin agreements enforced,
and if so, how? Clearly, if Marvin agreements are to be enforced
at all, they must be available to, and subject to the same
requirements for, same-sex couples as well as their opposite-sex
counterparts, or else equal protection issues will arise.115 More
difficult is deciding how to enforce Marvin rights to ensure
consistency and fairness. The answer lies in legislation, federal
or state, with the caveat that state legislation in this regard is
susceptible to repeal.116

113 Here, “unregistered” means same-sex couples that have opted not to become
domestic partners. The logic is that same-sex couples that have not taken advantage of
the most “marriage-like” relationship still sanctioned by the state may be at the mercy of
a pro-marriage (or failing that, pro-domestic partner) public policy similar to Hewitt. An
unmarried, unregistered same-sex partner, by asking a court to enforce a nonmarital
cohabitation contract, is asking the court on some level to recognize and protect that
partner’s interest in a type of relationship contrary to public policy.
114 See Wilson, supra note 108, at 339–40 (arguing that the Hewitt could be applied to
a same-sex cohabitation agreement). The author noted:
Although the holding in Hewitt is in fact cognizant of the gender of the parties
and the availability of marriage to them, it depends upon neither . . . Illinois
courts would not enforce what in effect are private contracts for marriage-like
relationships . . . [b]ecause [Hewitt’s] holding is not dependent upon the gender
of the parties being different (or “opposite sex”), its applicability is likely not so
restricted either. Such contracts between unmarried, same-sex couples likely
cannot withstand a challenge raising Hewitt as a defense.
Wilson, supra note 108, at 339–40. California’s same-sex cohabitation agreements are
vulnerable to Wilson’s warning about Hewitt because Proposition 8 parallels the
comparable Illinois legislation in making a strong statement about public policy. See
Maine Voters Repeal Gay-Marriage Law, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 4, 2009, 8:58 AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33609492/ns/politics-more_politics/. See also State Policies
on Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 107. Subsequently, other states’ voters have approved
ballot measures banning same-sex marriage. For example, Maine’s vote to repeal samesex marriage was surprising not only because Maine is a relatively progressive state, but
also because the November 3, 2009 vote marks the first time an electorate has rejected a
same-sex-marriage measure enacted by a legislature. All of the previously-rejected samesex marriage initiatives had been put forth by courts. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63–
64 (Cal. 2009). When even legislative pronouncements can be whisked away by voters,
California’s “pure contractual” approach may only be a ballot measure away from
extinction.
115 Inasmuch as requiring any additional requirements for same-sex couples, Marvin
agreements would impose special hardships not experienced by similarly-situated
opposite-sex partners, thereby triggering equal protection issues. See Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
116 See Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d, at 1209; Wilson, supra note 108, at 336.
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C. The Need for Legislative Recognition of Same-Sex
Cohabiting Couples
If same-sex cohabiting partners wish to have their Marvin
agreements consistently enforced, free from the vagaries of state
electorates and courts and without the public-policy sword of
Damocles117 hanging over their heads, they might pin their hopes
on federal legislation.118 However, two obstacles exist that, if
taken together, may render the option of federal intervention
moot. First, and most significantly, if Congress has the authority
to regulate cohabitation agreements, then the issue becomes one
of federal law, not state law. However, Marvin agreements are
essentially contracts, a subject that is typically the domain of
state courts.119 In this regard, hoping for federal intervention is
something of a Catch-22.120 Second, if marriage is solely a state
question, many states (like California) do not support same-sex
relationships, thus either disallow same-sex marriages or fail to
offer domestic partnerships, or both.121 It is possible that states
that offer neither same-sex marriage nor domestic partnerships
will nevertheless enforce Marvin agreements; however, as Hewitt
illustrates, public policy lurks in the background of nonmarital

117 Defined as “an impending disaster,” this idiom (first recorded in 1747) refers to
the legend of Damocles, a courtier to King Dionysius. The king, tired of Damocles’
incessant flattery, seated Damocles in a chair over which hung a sword suspended by a
single hair to impress upon Damocles the precariousness of his position. THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS 629 (Christine Ammer ed., 1997).
118 When states’ voters are 31-for-31 in rejecting same-sex marriage initiatives, and
Maine voters make history by overturning a legislatively-produced same-sex marriage
law, it seems that federal intervention is not only warranted, but necessary. But see infra
note 126. Such federal recognition would take the form of a statute, but it would have to
clear several hurdles that are discussed in Part V.B.
119 Federal courts acquire jurisdiction in cases that present a federal question under
the Constitution or federal law, or cases where the parties are from different states and
more than $75,000 is at issue. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2006). By this definition,
most cohabitation agreements will be relegated to state court.
120 The term “Catch-22,” first coined in Joseph Heller’s 1961 novel of the same name,
is defined as “[a] situation in which a desired outcome or solution is impossible to attain
because of a set of inherently illogical rules or conditions.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 292–93 (4th ed. 2000). See also THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS, supra note 117, at 108.
121 As of November 5, 2009, thirty-five states offered neither same-sex marriage nor
domestic partnerships. Same-sex marriage is currently available in Connecticut, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, and most recently New Hampshire, where same-sex
marriage has been legal since the beginning of 2010. Christine Vestal, Gay Marriage
Legal in Six States, STATELINE.ORG (June 4, 2009; 4:40 PM), http://www.stateline.org/live/
details/story?contentId=347390. Domestic partnerships (also called civil unions) are
available in some form in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New
Jersey, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin, plus the District of Columbia.
FREEDOMTOMARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states.php (last visited Nov. 10,
2010).
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relationship questions.122 Third, and most troubling, federal
legislation has effectively foreclosed meaningful recognition of
same-sex cohabitating relationships.
It not only defines
marriage as a union between a man and a woman, but also
allows states to refuse to recognize a “marriage” performed in
any other state, thereby ensuring that “marriage” will mean
whatever the enforcing state wants it to mean.123 Thus, in many
states, unmarried couples must overcome the presumption that
their relationships are unworthy of protection because public
policy favors a marriage relationship—the same point made in
Hewitt.124
Despite the Maine debacle,125 state legislation is a more
promising option for same-sex cohabiting couples, particularly in
a state like California that already recognizes same-sex couples
through domestic partnerships.126 The first step in devising
proposed legislation is to understand the contours of the issue; in
California, the Jones case showed that same-sex cohabiting
122 Public policy does not always weigh in on Marvin decisions, perhaps because such
agreements—particularly among same-sex couples—are comparatively rare. But Hewitt
is an example of how a court can look at a Marvin decision through a public-policy lens,
without promising results. States vary widely in their treatment of cohabitation
contracts. A sampling shows that Georgia, Illinois and Louisiana hold such agreements
unenforceable due to their immoral nature. In contrast, Kansas, Washington and West
Virginia require no formal or implied agreement, oral or written, but ask only that the
partners have lived together for some period of time in a stable domestic relationship.
Texas and Minnesota (to some degree) require express agreements to satisfy the Statute
of Frauds, while others, including Michigan, New Hampshire, New York and North
Dakota require express agreements and will not enforce implied contracts. In states
where cohabitation agreements are not subject to the Statute of Frauds, including
Arizona, Colorado, Florida and North Carolina, courts tend to follow the Marvin rationale
of enforcing agreements that are not based upon sexual considerations, or at least have
considerations other than sexual services. Furthermore, some states, such as Arizona,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey and Wisconsin, recognize implied
agreements. William A. Reppy, Jr., Choice of Law Problems Arising When Unmarried
Cohabitants Change Domicile, 55 SMU L. REV. 273, 275–90 (2002).
123 The federal Defense of Marriage Act, passed in 1996, announces itself as “an Act
to define and protect the institution of marriage.” Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No.
104-199, § 1738C, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996). Under the heading “Powers Reserved to
the States,” the Act provides that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship. . . . [T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to
a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
Defense of Marriage Act § 1738C.
124 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979).
125 See Wilson, supra note 108.
126 The idea here is that a state offering neither same-sex marriage nor domestic
partnerships has no compelling policy reason to enforce Marvin agreements, insofar as
those agreements endorse unmarried relationships.
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partners face severability issues, while Proposition 8 and
California’s domestic partner statutes show that California’s
public policy strongly favors formally-recognized relationships
regardless of sex.127 Thus, a proposed statute must accomplish
two primary things if it is to afford same-sex couples a consistent,
uniform method of enforcing Marvin agreements. First, it must
specifically enumerate under what circumstances a same-sex
couple may contract for property and services, and particularly
when sexual services become severable.128 Second, it must ratify
the same-sex cohabiting relationship in a way that neither
infringes upon the state’s public policy favoring marriage, nor
seeks to resurrect common-law marriage.129
In the end, whether it favors or disfavors same-sex
cohabitation agreements, the California Legislature must clarify
the rights of same-sex cohabiting couples because the case law is
sparse and inconsistent130 and Proposition 8 has ushered in a
public policy unfavorable to same-sex couples.131
Just as
Proposition 8 defines the rights of same-sex couples wishing to
marry, a same-sex cohabitation statute should define the rights
of same-sex couples who do not wish to marry, or its
equivalent.132 In an effort to urge the Legislature to decide the
issue, this article thus proposes two statutes, one favoring samesex cohabitation agreements and one disfavoring such
agreements. A statute designed to enforce same-sex Marvin
agreements on a purely contractual basis has already been
proposed, but came at a time when California’s public policy
landscape was vastly different.133 Therefore, each proposed

127 Both traditionally solemnized marriage and domestic partnerships have been
sanctioned by the Legislature, and hence qualify as “formally recognized.”
128 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
129 See Norman v. Norman, 54 P. 143, 146 (Cal. 1898) (“Prior to 1895, section 75 [of
the California Civil Code] provided for marriages by declaration, without the
solemnization required by section 70; however, the act of March 26, 1895, swept away
that easy process of marriage.”).
130 “Sparse and inconsistent” refers to the relative dearth of Marvin decisions, and
the clashing Jones and Whorton decisions in particular.
131 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
132 “Marriage equivalent” refers to domestic partnerships as a marriage-like option
for same-sex couples.
133 See generally Kristin Bullock, Comment, Applying Marvin v. Marvin to Same-Sex
Couples: A Proposal for a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation Contract Statute, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1029 (1992). When Bullock published her Comment, the prevailing sign of
California’s public policy was section 308.5 of the California Family Code which restricted
California’s recognition of marriage to those between a man and a woman and was
enacted following the passage of Proposition 22. Since Bullock’s article in 1992,
Proposition 8 and the domestic partnership statutes have changed California’s views on
same-sex relationships considerably.
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statute will reflect the public policy aspect implicit in California’s
same-sex relationships, which the earlier statute did not.134
V. TWO PROPOSED CALIFORNIA COHABITATION STATUTES
REFLECTIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY
A. Proposed California Family Code Sections 297.6 and 297.7:
Rights of Same-Sex Couples to Make Enforceable Cohabitation
Agreements135
The following are two proposed statutes for the California
legislature to consider in order to clarify the uncertainty
surrounding Proposition 8. One statute allows California’s samesex cohabiting couples to make enforceable property and support
agreements, while respecting the state’s public policy favoring
marriage as expressed in Proposition 8. The other statute
disallows same-sex couples that are not registered as domestic
partners from making cohabitation agreements, with the
domestic-partner restriction likewise reflective of California’s
public policy.
§ 297.6: Unmarried couples, regardless of sex, shall have
the full and exclusive right to make enforceable
agreements for support and division of property, their
marital status notwithstanding, as part of any committed
relationship, whether including sexual relations or not,
where the agreement expressly or impliedly lists any
reasonable consideration for the services rendered other
than the mere instance of sexual relations.
This section recognizes that such agreements arise from
relationships that in no way resemble traditional
marriage between a man and a woman, and in enforcing
this section and respecting the current public policy of
this state, the Legislature in no way approves of or
endorses such relationships for their moral character, or
for any other reason. Furthermore, this section in no
way grants unmarried same-sex couples any of the rights
134 While Bullock’s statute is intelligently fashioned, it treats same-sex cohabitation
contracts as solely a contract issue, while Proposition 8 and other California legislation
clearly indicates the state has a strong public policy favoring traditional marriage.
Furthermore, Bullock supports her contention that California is increasingly amendable
to same-sex Marvin agreements by citing only Whorton and one Texas case, which does
not represent a resounding mandate. Simply put, no one knows whether California courts
will continue to enforce same-sex Marvin agreements at all, particularly in light of
Proposition 8’s seismic shift of the public-policy landscape. California courts may
continue to treat Marvin agreements as purely contractual issues divorced from public
policy, but this Comment argues that it is shortsighted to assume that what were once
purely contractual considerations will always remain so.
135 These section numbers were chosen so the proposed statutes would immediately
follow the first domestic partnership statute in the California Family Code.
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enjoyed by married persons or domestic partners, nor
should any provision of this section impair or otherwise
affect the rights of traditional married couples to enjoy
any of the rights afforded them under California law.
(a) For the purposes of this section, the following
definitions shall apply:
(1) “Unmarried couple” shall refer to the committed
relationship of two persons, regardless of sexual
orientation, who live full-time with one another in the
same residence but have not solemnized their union with
formal state recognition, either traditional marriage or a
domestic partnership.
(2) “Sex” shall refer to the biological orientation of
each partner, with transgendered individuals to be
classified according to their biological sex at the time
when the agreement was made.
(3) “Agreement” shall refer to an enforceable contract
with ample consideration, according to generally accepted
principles of California contract law.
(4) “Marital status” shall refer to a traditional
marriage as defined in the California Constitution and
section 300 of the California Family Code ,136 or a
domestic partnership as set forth in section 297 of the
California Family Code, or the absence of either relation
thereof.
(5) “Committed relationship” shall refer to relationships where both partners have been exclusively
domiciled with one another in a common residence, and
where the partners have engaged in sexual relations and
other indicia of an exclusive, intimate relationship, for a
period of no less than ten (10) years.137 Partners whose
relationships do not meet the ten year standard, yet who
seek to enforce such property or support agreements, will
have their recovery, if any, prorated according to a
percentage commensurate with the length of their
relationship under this section.138

136 “Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and
a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of making the contract is necessary.”
CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (Deering 2010).
137 This provision is intended to reflect section 4336 of the California Family Code
regarding spousal support, where the legislature defines a “long marriage” as one of ten
year duration or more. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4336 (Deering 2010). Just as a long marriage
has different spousal support requirements than a short one, so too should cohabiting
partners have different obligations to one another depending on the length of their
cohabitation.
138 Likewise, this proposed term is based upon the California Family Code’s spousal
support provisions. Among the factors governing spousal support is the expectation that
a party seeking support will be self-supporting within a time equivalent to one-half of the
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(6) “Sexual relations” shall refer to the physical act
and shall be construed as one part of, but not an essential
or irreducible aspect of, a committed intimate
relationship.
(b) For the purposes of this section, home-based
activities, including but not limited to cooking, cleaning,
and housework in general, and activities typical of a
committed partner, including but not limited to moral
and emotional support, are not to be considered related in
any way to the couple’s sexual relationship, and may
constitute adequate, independent consideration for any
agreement.
§ 297.7: Unmarried couples, regardless of sex, who share
a common residence shall be prohibited from making
enforceable agreements for support and division of
property, regardless of the length of their relationship,
where such couples share a committed relationship
marked by sexual relations and/or other indicia of an
exclusive intimate relationship, and the partners are
neither legally married to one another under section 300
of the California Family Code nor registered together as
domestic partners under section 297 of the California
Family Code.
(a) For the purposes of this section, the following
definitions shall apply:
(1) “Unmarried couple” shall refer to the committed
relationship of two persons, regardless of sexual
orientation, who live full-time with one another in the
same residence but have not solemnized their union with
formal state recognition, either traditional marriage or a
domestic partnership.
(2) “Sex” shall refer to the biological orientation of
each partner, with transgendered individuals to be
classified according to their biological sex at the time
when the agreement was made.
(3) “Agreement” shall refer to an enforceable contract
with ample consideration, according to generally accepted
principles of California contract law.
(4) “Marital status” shall refer to a traditional
marriage as defined in the California Constitution and

marriage’s duration, up to the ten year limit expressed in section 4336. The idea is that,
theoretically, the longer a marriage lasts, the more responsibility one partner has to
support the other afterward. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (Deering 2010). The author has
adapted the provision to fit a cohabitation agreement, whereby the longer the
cohabitation, and therefore the longer the “marriage-like” relation lasts, the greater the
expectation that one party must support the other under the agreement.
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section 300 of the California Family Code139, or a
domestic partnership as set forth in section 297 of the
California Family Code, or the absence of either relation
thereof.
(5) “Committed relationship” shall refer to relationships where both partners have been exclusively
domiciled with one another in a common residence, and
where the partners have engaged in sexual relations and
other indicia of an exclusive, intimate relationship, for a
period of no less than ten (10) years.140
(6) “Sexual relations” shall refer to the physical act
and shall be construed as an irreducible aspect of a
committed intimate relationship, consistent with the
interpretation of the California judiciary.
B. Note on Proposed Cohabitation Statutes
The point of these proposed statutes is to urge the California
Legislature to clarify the state of Marvin agreements under the
new Proposition 8 public policy.141 Section 297.6, which allows
Marvin agreements, must navigate a public-policy minefield that
is hostile to same-sex relationships, so it is much longer and
requires a more careful definition of terms.142 In contrast, section
297.7, which disallows Marvin agreements regardless of sexual
orientation, is shorter and less ambiguous, and is supported by a
public policy subtext disfavoring non-formalized marriage
relationships.143 While same-sex marriage statutes are not
permanent,144 they can at least offer some insight as to what
rights, if any, same-sex couples have in making and enforcing

See supra note 137.
See supra note 137.
To the extent the California Supreme Court insists Proposition 8 merely reserves
the designation “marriage” for opposite-sex couples and otherwise does not affect couples’
constitutional rights to enjoy intimate, committed relationships, the court has already
spoken regarding same-sex couples’ Marvin rights. Nothing intrinsic to a same-sex
relationship qua same-sex relationship should affect its Marvin standing. See supra note
93. However, the Strauss decision did not address the practical realities of Marvin
agreements, and such contractual agreements are not under constitutional purview
anyway, but are governed instead by civil law—hence the urgency for legislative
clarification.
142 See supra Parts V.A & B. A particular conundrum is distinguishing cohabitation
from marriage-like relationships in light of California’s public policy favoring marriage or
other formalized relationships, e.g., domestic partnerships. The challenge lies in
enforcing agreements arising from relationships that are sufficiently intimate and lengthy
so as to warrant governmental protection and recognition, without treating those
relationships too much like marriages.
143 See supra Part V.B. This proposed statute did not need to address the severability
of sexual relations, nor the possibility that a same-sex relationship might presume to be
“marriage-like” in the sense that the Hewitt court disfavored. See supra note 105.
144 See supra note 108.
139
140
141
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Marvin agreements.
After all, some information, however
fleeting, is preferable to perpetual uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
With the enduring popularity of cohabitation as a lifestyle
choice,145 it is noteworthy that California courts have yet to
clarify cohabitating same-sex partners’ rights regarding
enforceable property and support agreements.146
Same-sex
partners particularly deserve clarification because their
relationships have been circumscribed by legislation ranging
from Proposition 22 to Proposition 8.147 Highlighting the need for
clarity on this issue and showing how recent shifts in public
policy color the enforceability of such agreements, this Comment
offers two proposed statutes to decide the viability of today’s
same-sex Marvin agreements.148 Proponents of same-sex
marriage have talked of mounting a ballot challenge to
Proposition 8, perhaps as early as 2012, leaving only speculation
in the meantime as to whether same-sex couples’ rights have
fundamentally changed since Proposition 8 passed in 2008.149
California’s same-sex couples will thus continue their uneven
journey along the “yellow brick road,” but it is unclear whether
they will ever reach the Emerald City.
POSTSCRIPT
The avowed ballot challenge150 to Proposition 8 was mooted
on August 4, 2010, when District Court Judge Vaughn R. Walker
ruled in Perry v. Schwarzenegger that Proposition 8 was
unconstitutional.151 Judge Walker’s decision, which unequivocally found that Proposition 8 violated the Equal
See supra discussion Part II.A.
This statement not only points out the ambiguity inherent in severing sexual
relations from an agreement for services, but also suggests that California courts will not
continue to overlook public policy considerations in addressing Marvin agreements, if they
ever have.
147 Domestic partnership legislation, as discussed earlier, has also circumscribed
same-sex couples’ rights, although it has arguably been a positive influence.
148 See supra note 111.
149 Attendees at a Chapman University School of Law presentation in November 2009
indicated an effort to repeal Proposition 8 was forthcoming, if not in 2010, then in 2012.
They will be greeted by a wearied, but not unsympathetic, electorate: in a November 2009
poll, Californians indicated they supported marriage rights for same-sex partners by a
51% to 43% margin. However, nearly 60% of those polled indicated they did not want to
vote on the issue in 2010. Cathleen Decker, State’s Voters Support Same-Sex Marriage,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at A4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/08/local/
me-gay-marriage-poll8 (last visited Dec. 10. 2010).
150 See supra note 149.
151 Jesse McKinley & John Schwartz, California’s Ban on Gay Marriage is Struck
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A1, available at http://nytimes.com/2010/08/05/us/
05prop.html.
145
146
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,152 immediately
set off jubilation among supporters of same-sex marriage and
strident rhetoric among those opposed.153 Supporters of the
legislation immediately filed a motion to stay the decision, which
Judge Walker promptly denied.154 Predictably, the Perry decision
sparked a series of appeals, not only to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, but also to Governor Schwarzenegger and Attorney
General Edmund (Jerry) Brown, pleading with them to defend
Proposition 8.155 Neither has indicated that he will defend the
measure, which is slated to go before the Ninth Circuit in
December.156 Proposition 8 is expected to reach the United
States Supreme Court no matter what the Ninth Circuit decides,
with some already speculating which Justice might provide the
swing vote on the sharply-divided Court.157
Yet, while the recent hubbub over Proposition 8 makes for
good newspaper and Internet copy, it leaves unanswered the
question that inspired this Comment: whether California’s samesex couples will enjoy greater freedom to make and enforce
cohabitation agreements. Most of the public’s attention has
focused on the agitation over Proposition 8—as if the Perry
decision needed any historical boost, it came down on President
Barack Obama’s forty-ninth birthday—and the controversy has
drawn legal luminaries such as David Boies and Ted Olson, who
became household names during the Bush v. Gore controversy.158
Meanwhile, same-sex couples eschewing domestic partnerships,
who must resort to Marvin agreements, have remained largely
anonymous and on the sidelines.
In that regard, California’s cohabitating same-sex couples
are to their marriage-seeking counterparts what Deanna Durbin
is to Judy Garland. Durbin was one of MGM’s first choices for
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
See supra note 151.
Perry, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–39. Judge Walker found that proponents of
Proposition 8 met neither of the two most critical requirements for issuing a stay: they
could not show the likelihood of success on the merits, and they could not show
irreparable injury were their motion denied. Id. at 1134–38. Judge Walker also
questioned whether proponents of the measure had standing to pursue their appeal, but
found their argument unconvincing regardless. Id. at 1134–36.
155 Susan Ferriss, Supporters Pressure Brown, Schwarzenegger to Defend Prop. 8 in
Court, SACBEE.COM (Sept. 2, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2010/09/02/
2999833/supporters-pressure-brown-schwarzenegger.html.
156 Id.
Judge Walker noted both Brown and Schwarzenegger’s unwillingness to
defend Proposition 8 in his decision finding the legislation unconstitutional. See supra
note 151.
157 Edward A. Adams, House Supports Marriage Equality Resolution, 96 A.B.A. J. 62,
62 (2010), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_backs_marriage_
equality_for_gays_and_lesbians.
158 See supra note151.
152
153
154

Do Not Delete

2011]

3/17/2011 12:24 AM

The Yellow Brick Road to Nowhere

515

the role of Dorothy Gale in The Wizard of Oz, but has faded into
obscurity as Garland became synonymous with the role and the
film.159 If history is a guide, Proposition 8 will be associated with
same-sex marriage in the same way Garland is associated with
The Wizard of Oz, and same-sex cohabitating couples may fade
into oblivion the same way Durbin is now best known as the
answer to a trivia question. The comparison is apt: Durbin had
her heyday in the late 1930s but is largely anonymous now,160
just as same-sex cohabitation had its heyday in the wake of
Marvin but such couples get scant attention now. The purpose of
this Comment is to highlight the lesser-known stakeholders in
the same-sex rights debate, in the hope that California’s samesex couples get better directions from California courts than
Dorothy got from the Scarecrow.

159 Durbin, a Canadian-born actress who won a special “Juvenile Oscar” in 1938, had
a film career spanning the late 1930s and 1940s. Deanna Durbin, INTERNET MOVIE
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0002052/bio (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). For
more on Durbin, see Tim Dirks’ review of The Wizard of Oz on the American Movie
Classics website, http://www.filmsite.org/wiza.html.
160 PAULINE KAEL, 5001 NIGHTS AT THE MOVIES 136 (1991). As for the relative
invisibility of same-sex couples after Marvin, it bears noting that the only prominent
same-sex cohabitation cases, discussed supra, arose in its immediate aftermath. One
puzzling issue is what has happened to all the same-sex Marvin agreements since then.
Same-sex couples might not be making Marvin agreements, or might not be enforcing
them, or might simply be keeping their agreements out of court. Which factor
predominates is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this Comment.

